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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an unconditionally secure means of 
communication based on the laws of quantum mechanics [1]. Currently, a major 
challenge is to achieve a QKD system with a 40 dB channel loss, which is required 
if we are to realize global scale QKD networks using communication satellites [2]. 
Here we report the first QKD experiment in which secure keys were distributed 
over 42 dB channel loss and 200 km of optical fibre. We employed the differential 
phase shift quantum key distribution (DPS-QKD) protocol [3] implemented with a 
10-GHz clock frequency, and superconducting single photon detectors (SSPD) 
based on NbN nanowire [4,5]. The SSPD offers a very low dark count rate (a few 
Hz) and small timing jitter (60 ps full width at half maximum). These 
characteristics allowed us to construct a 10-GHz clock QKD system and thus 
distribute secure keys over channel loss of 42 dB. In addition, we achieved a 17 
kbit/s secure key rate over 105 km of optical fibre, which is two orders of 
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magnitude higher than the previous record, and a 12.1 bit/s secure key rate over 
200 km of optical fibre, which is the longest terrestrial QKD yet demonstrated. The 
keys generated in our experiment are secure against both general collective attacks 
on individual photons [6] and a specific collective attack on multi-photons, known 
as a sequential unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [7]. 
Since the first QKD experiment using a 1-m free space transmission line was 
reported over a decade ago [8], the key distribution distance in QKD experiments has 
continued to increase. Most of those experiments employed the Bennett and Brassard 
(BB84) protocol [9] with attenuated laser light as the photon source, but did not 
generate secure keys because of their vulnerability against a photon number splitting 
(PNS) attack [10,11]. In a PNS attack, an eavesdropper (Eve) undertakes a quantum 
non-demolition (QND) measurement on each weak coherent pulse. If Eve finds more 
than one photon in one pulse, she keeps one photon in her quantum memory and sends 
the others to Bob through her lossless transmission line. After knowing the 
measurement basis through the public communication between Alice and Bob, Eve can 
perform a projective measurement for a stored photon, and thus obtain full information 
about the pulse without causing any bit errors. This attack seriously limits the 
performance of BB84 QKD systems implemented with coherent light sources. The most 
obvious but technologically difficult way to prevent a PNS attack is to use a 
deterministic single photon source. Motivated by this reasoning, intensive research on 
single photon sources is being undertaken worldwide [12-14]. In fact, several BB84-
QKD experiments with single photon sources have been carried out [15, 16], but the 
improvement in the secure key rate has been rather limited due to the residual two 
photon probability )0()2(
)2(
2
1 gP ≤ of the single photon source [17]. Figure 1 shows the 
secure key rate vs. channel loss for BB84 systems using single photon sources with 
varying )0(
)2(g . The best )0(
)2(g  for an experimental single photon source is currently 
limited to 0.01 [12-14].  
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An alternative approach is to find new protocols that are robust against a PNS 
attack [3, 18, 19]. With the decoy-state BB84 protocol [18,19], decoy pulses are 
randomly inserted whose average photon number is higher than that of the signal pulses. 
Recently, a 107-km secure key distribution with a bit rate of about 0.1 bit/s has been 
reported using superconducting transition edge sensors [20].  
With the DPS protocol [3], the quantum state of a single photon is defined over 
many pulses from a coherent laser source. Alice randomly modulates the phase of each 
pulse emitted from the source by {0,π}. The intensity of the pulse train is adjusted so 
that the average photon number per pulse becomes much less than one. Bob is equipped 
with a 1-bit delayed Mach-Zehnder interferometer, whose two output ports are followed 
by two single photon detectors. When the phase difference between two adjacent pulses 
is 0 (π), detector 0 (1) clicks. Since the average photon number per pulse is much less 
than one, Bob’s detectors click only occasionally. Bob discloses the time instances in 
which he observed the clicks to Alice via public communication, while withholding 
which-detector information. With the time instance information and original modulation 
data, Alice knows which detector clicked in those time instances at Bob’s site. 
Therefore, Alice and Bob can share an identical bit string that can be used as a key for 
one-time pad cryptography.  
Since a QND measurement on two consecutive pulses breaks the coherence of the 
multiple-pulse quantum state, a standard PNS attack based on a QND measurement 
introduces bit errors. Eve can reduce the error probability by increasing the number of 
pulses simultaneously monitored by a QND measurement, but the probability of Eve 
obtaining the key information also decreases, because the detector click, that is a 
collapse of the wavefunction, occurs randomly and non-deterministically for Bob’s and 
Eve’s wavepackets. Even if Eve has the technology to undertake such a PNS attack on 
an arbitrary number of time slots, the fraction of information that Eve can obtain using a 
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PNS attack is given by 2μ, where μ denotes the average photon number per pulse [6]. In 
the presence of system errors, Eve can also launch an optimal quantum measurement 
attack on a fraction of the photons transmitted to Bob, whose collision probability pc0 
for each bit is bounded as  
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where e denotes the system’s innocent bit error rate. Then, considering a two-fold 
attack composed of a PNS attack and an optimal quantum measurement attack, the 
upper bound of the collision probability of n-bit sifted key cp  is given by [6] 
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Thus, the compression factor τ in the privacy amplification process is calculated 
as 
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The secure key rate Rsecure is reduced from the sifted key rate Rsifted according to 
{ })()(sec ehefRR siftedure += τ ,     (4) 
where )1(log)1(log)( 22 eeeeeh −−−−=  is a binary entropy function, and f(e) 
characterizes the performance of the error correction algorithm.  
Figure 1 plots the secure key rates vs. channel loss for DPS-QKD using a standard 
coherent laser source and BB84 using single photon sources with various characteristics. 
Here, we assumed the same detector condition as in the experiment described below 
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(quantum efficiency 1.4%, dark count rate 50 Hz, time window width 50 ps, and 36% 
reduction of effective quantum efficiency due to time window). As regards the BB84 
system, we assumed an ideal implementation, namely active demodulation with no 
additional loss, so Bob uses only two single photon detectors. The maximum channel 
loss of the DPS-QKD system is larger than that of the BB84 system using a single 
photon source with 
5)2( 10)0( −=g  and an efficiency 1=η , which is far beyond the 
current experimental reach [12-14].  
 
 
Figure 1: Secure key rate as a function of channel loss. Black solid line: BB84 with an 
ideal single photon source, blue line: BB84 with a single photon source with 
6)2( 10)0( −=g , red line: BB84 with a single photon source with 
5)2( 10)0( −=g , green 
line: DPS-QKD, pink line: BB84 with a single photon source with 
2)2( 10)0( −=g , black 
dotted line: BB84 with an attenuated laser source.  
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Figure 2: Experimental set-up for 10-GHz clock DPS-QKD. 
Figure 2 shows the system configuration of the 10-GHz clock DPS-QKD system. 
A continuous wave output from a laser is transformed into a 10-GHz clock pulse train 
by an InGaAsP electro-absorption (EA) modulator. We generated pulses with a full 
width at half maximum of 15 ps. The phase of each pulse is modulated by a phase 
modulator driven by a 10-GHz pseudo random bit pattern from a high-speed pulse 
pattern generator. The average photon number per pulse is adjusted to 0.2 by an optical 
attenuator. The quantum channel is a dispersion shifted fibre (DSF) or a single 
attenuator. Bob is equipped with a 1-bit delayed interferometer fabricated using planar 
lightwave circuit technology. The excess loss of the interferometer is 2.5 dB. Each 
output port of the interferometer is connected to an SSPD. The photon detection time 
instances and which-detector information are recorded using a time interval analyser 
(TIA). In our experiment, sifted keys were actually generated between Alice and Bob, 
and the error rate was measured by directly comparing Alice’s key with Bob’s key. For 
each data point described below, we undertook five runs of QKD sessions, and the error 
rates and sifted key rates are the average of the five runs. The secure key rates were 
calculated by plugging the experimentally obtained error rates and sifted key rates into 
Eq. (4). 
Figure 3 (a) shows a close-up image of an SSPD, which consists of a 100-nm 
wide, 4-nm thick NbN superconducting wire. The SSPD is coupled to a 9-μm core 
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single-mode fibre as shown in Fig. 3 (b). The packaged detector is housed in a closed-
cycle cryogen-free refrigerator with an operating temperature of 3 K, for convenient use 
in quantum information experiments [21]. The detector operates as follows: the 
superconducting wire is current-biased slightly below its critical current. When a photon 
hits the wire, a resistive hot spot is formed. Then the current density around the spot 
increases and eventually exceeds the critical current. As a result, a non-superconducting 
barrier is formed across the entire width of the wire, and a voltage pulse is formed. By 
discriminating the starting edge of the voltage pulses, we can measure the photon arrival 
time with a high timing resolution. The quantum efficiency and dark count rate of the 
SSPD vary when the bias current is changed. The single photon counting mechanism of 
an avalanche photodiode (APD) is complex (consisting of absorption, diffusion and 
avalanche), which results in excess dark counts and non-Gaussian timing jitter 
characteristics. On the other hand, the principle of SSPD is rather simple as explained 
above, which makes the dark count rate and timing resolution characteristics of the 
SSPD superior to those of an APD. We measured the timing jitter of the SSPD by 
launching 10-ps pulses. Figure 3(c) compares the obtained histogram of the photon 
arrival time with that of a single photon detector based on a frequency up-converter 
followed by a Si APD, which was used in our previous DPS-QKD experiments [22]. 
Here, the blue squares and the line denote the histogram for the SSPD, and the red line 
is that for the up-conversion detector. Even though the full width at half maximum 
(FWHM) of the jitter was approximately 60 ps, which is larger than that of the up-
conversion single photon detectors, the histogram fits very well with Gaussian, and does 
not have a long tail, as observed in similar measurement for the up-conversion detectors 
[22]. Therefore, we can reduce the error probability caused by inter-symbol interference 
by using SSPD. In addition, the dark count rate of the SSPD was measured to be <10 Hz 
(typically a few Hz) when the quantum efficiency was set at 0.7%, which is much 
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smaller than that of the up-conversion detector operated in a similar quantum efficiency 
(350 Hz at 0.4% quantum efficiency [22]). 
 
Figure 3: (a) SSPD close-up image observed with scanning electron microscope (b) 
Fibre alignment under optical microscope (c) Histograms of photon arrival time of 
SSPD (squares and blue line) and up-conversion detector (red line) when 10-ps pulse is 
input.  
We further apply a narrow time window to the obtained time-instance data to 
reduce the contributions of the dark counts and the inter-symbol interference caused by 
neighbouring signals. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, we obtained a 
histogram of the photon arrival time detected by one of two SSPDs. Here, the quantum 
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efficiency and dark count rate of the SSPD were set at 0.7% and <10 Hz, respectively, 
and the channel loss was 31.7 dB. Figure 4 (a) shows the histogram when no time 
window was used. We observed a signal pulse overlap caused by the detector timing 
jitter. However, the peaks were well separated when we employed a 10-ps time window 
(Fig. 4 (b)).  
 
Figure 4:  Histogram of the received 10-GHz clock signal. (a) without time window, (b) 
with 10-ps time window.  
In the QKD experiment, we set the quantum efficiency, dark count rate and time 
window width at 1.4%, 50 Hz and 50 ps, respectively. The use of the time window 
reduced the effective quantum efficiency by 36%. The obtained secure key rates are 
shown by squares in Fig. 5, where filled and open symbols show fibre transmission 
points and simulated points with an optical attenuator, respectively. The solid line 
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shows the theoretical curve calculated assuming a quantum efficiency, dark count rate 
and baseline system error of 1.4%, 50 Hz and 2.3%, respectively. We also undertook a 
DPS-QKD experiment with a 1-GHz clock, and the result is shown by the triangles in 
Fig. 5 [23]. The present result significantly outperforms previous QKD experiments 
both in secure key generation rate and distribution distance. At 105 km, we successfully 
generated secure keys at a rate of 17 kbit/s, which is two orders of magnitude greater 
than the previous record (166 bit/s at 100 km) [22]. In a 200 km fibre transmission 
experiment, we were able to generate secure keys with a bit rate of 12 bit/s. The 
maximum channel loss for secure key generation was 42.1 dB, which is more than 20 
dB greater than that of previous long-distance QKD experiments.  
Thus far, we have discussed security based on general collective attacks for 
individual photons. Now, we consider security against a sequential USD attack, which 
was proposed in [7]. The basic idea behind this type of attack is summarized here. First, 
we consider the worst case by assuming that Eve has a local oscillator that is phase-
locked to the coherent light source owned by Alice. Thanks to this local oscillator, with 
a probability of )2exp(1 μ−−  Eve can unambiguously discriminate whether each pulse 
is phase-modulated by 0 or π  When Eve obtains m (>M) successful sequential 
measurement outcomes, she constructs m trains of coherent pulses with phase 
modulations that depend on the measurement outcomes, and resends them to Bob. If 
Eve obtains m (=M) successful sequential measurement outcomes, with probability p 
she resends m trains of coherent pulses with the corresponding phase modulations, and 
with a probability of 1-p she resends a vacuum. Finally, if Eve obtains m (<M) 
successful sequential measurement outcomes, she resends a vacuum. In this attack, no 
error occurs inside the pulse train, but the boundary of pulse and vacuum causes a 
random error. Note that a high channel loss gives Eve an advantage because the number 
of consecutive successful USD attacks is not necessarily large. Thus, this sequential 
USD attack can be a potential threat when the channel loss is large.  
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To investigate the security against sequential USD attack, we also calculated the 
error threshold for this attack. The error threshold for a 200 km transmission using 
SSPDs with 1.4% quantum efficiency (with 36% reduction of effective quantum 
efficiency by the time window) was 4.74%. With μ=0.2, the error threshold for 
generating keys that are secure against general collective attack for individual photons is 
approximately 4.1%. This means that for our DPS-QKD experiments with SSPDs, 
general collective attacks on individual photons [6] gives a tighter security bound than a 
sequential USD attack [7]. Therefore, the experimental data shown by squares in Fig. 5 
were all secure against both general collective attacks on individual photons and a 
sequential USD attack.  
In conclusion, we described a 10-GHz clock differential phase shift quantum key 
distribution experiment using SSPDs. The small dark count rate and small timing jitter 
of the SSPD enabled us to generate secure keys with a 10-GHz clock system for the first 
time. We have distributed secure keys against general collective attacks for individual 
photons and a sequential USD attack over 200 km of fibre and with a 42.1 dB channel 
loss. In addition, we achieved a 17 kbit/s secure key rate at 105 km, which is two orders 
of magnitude larger than the previous record. We expect that this result to constitute an 
important step towards realizing both inter-city terrestrial QKD systems and global 
QKD systems using communication satellites that normally require a 30-35 dB channel 
loss [2,24].  
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Figure 5: secure key rate as a function of fibre length with 0.2 dB/km loss. The squares 
and triangles show secure key rates measured generated by 10-GHz and 1-GHz clock 
systems with SSPDs. The filled and open symbols denote fibre transmissions and 
optical attenuation, respectively.  
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